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Cracks in the Online “Caliphate”: How the Islamic State is 
Losing Ground in the Battle for Cyberspace
by Miron Lakomy
Abstract
This article argues that the Islamic State’s cyber jihad, fully launched in 2014, is currently undergoing a 
regression that is demonstrated by the weakening of its quality, coverage and effectiveness. Comparing the 
character, major forms and popularity of Daesh’s releases from 2014 and 2015 with its most up-to-date 
productions, one can notice evident alterations signaling the long-awaited, but limited as yet, impairment of 
the “Caliphate’s” propaganda machine, composed of such specialized cells as the Amaq News Agency, al-Furqan 
Media, al-I’tisam Foundation, al-Himmah Library, or the al-Hayat Media Center. This transition is caused by a 
multitude of factors, with both offline and online origins.
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Introduction
The phenomenon of cyber jihad has been thoroughly discussed by the academic community, blogosphere 
pundits, the media and government decision-makers around the world. Despite the fact that it has been 
ongoing for more than two decades, Islamist propaganda in cyberspace has only recently been widely 
recognized as a top international security threat.[1] This is mostly due to the fact that in 2014 the Islamic 
State launched the most advanced, massive and probably also the most efficient cyber jihad campaign ever. Its 
operations online resulted in, to use U.S. military doctrine terms, shock and awe among Western audiences. 
Images and recordings of brutally decapitated, shot or burned hostages, professionally recorded and 
directed, instantly proliferated over the Web 2.0 environment, reaching millions of Internet users. A similar 
phenomenon (but on a smaller scale) has occurred with other advanced releases of Daesh: battle footage, 
“documentaries”, online magazines, and nasheed music videos.
It is unsurprising that much has already been written about the character of the Islamic State’s activities on 
the Internet. Some academics have focused their research on the communication channels exploited by 
Daesh, while others have analyzed the content of its propaganda releases. Moreover, many scientists have 
attempted to assess the impact of its cyber jihad on international security.[2] All these monographs, papers 
and reports usually have one thing in common–they all agree that the Islamic State’s propaganda on the 
Internet is sophisticated, well-thought-out, and a threat to the internal stability and safety of developed states.
With this background in mind, this article argues that the Islamic State’s cyber jihad–fully launched at the 
turn of 2014[3]–is currently undergoing a regression that is demonstrated by the weakening of its quality, 
coverage and effectiveness. Comparing the character, major forms and popularity of Daesh’s releases from 
2014 and 2015 to its most up-to-date productions, one can notice evident alterations signaling the long-
awaited (though currently limited) impairment of the “Caliphate’s” propaganda machine, composed of such 
specialized cells as the Amaq News Agency, al-Furqan Media, al-I’tisam Foundation, al-Himmah Library, or 
the al-Hayat Media Center. This transition is caused by a multitude of factors, with both off-line and on-line 
origins.
This study has two major goals. The first is to compare the current characteristics of the Islamic State’s 
cyber jihad with its 2014-2015 features. There are several distinct differences regarding (among others) 
the distribution strategies exploited, the scope of propaganda proliferation, and the quantity and quality of 
various materials. The second goal is to provide an answer to an important question: What has influenced 
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the recent degradation of Daesh’s psychological operations (PSYOPs) in cyberspace? This issue has crucial 
meaning for international security, as it may suggest which anti-jihadi solutions introduced by developed 
states are proving to be effective in the long run.
In order to achieve these goals, this article has been divided into three parts. The first contains an overview of 
the Islamic State’s initial cyber jihad features, as well as the reasons why it became so successful. The second 
examines the major negative changes in the online activities conducted by Daesh that have taken place since 
the end of 2015. Finally, the last section of the article explains what has caused this degradation.
Islamic State’s Online Blitz, 2014-2015
The Islamic State’s full-blown propaganda campaign in cyberspace was launched at the turn of 2014, which 
slightly preceded the proclamation of the “Caliphate”.[4] This does not mean that ISIS/ISIL did not devote 
its resources to cyber jihad before. It is clear that the organization had developed its information warfare 
capabilities throughout the Syrian conflict, which was proved by many releases posted online in 2012 and 
2013.[5] The quality of these early productions varied. Some, like the famous rally video depicting probably 
the ill-famed Jihadi John and Abu Omar al-Shishani, were no different from other Islamist terrorists’ 
productions at the time.[6] Others constituted glimpses of their future mastery in online PSYOPs. As early as 
November 2013, ISIS combat footage, recorded in high definition, had already drawn limited attention from 
Internet users on the popular video hosting service LiveLeak due to its unusual technical parameters and the 
proficiency of its director.[7] The upsurge in the quality and quantity of propaganda releases corresponded 
with fast territorial gains at the time. In effect, when the “Caliphate” was declared on June 29, 2014, the basic 
tools of cyber jihad–aiming to indoctrinate and gather the support of Muslim societies around the world, as 
well as to intimidate its real or imaginary enemies–were tried, tested and ready to go.
There are various opinions among academics concerning the major goals of the Islamic State’s cyber jihad. 
On the one hand, according to Gabi Siboni, Daniel Cohen and Tal Koren: “ISIS’s propaganda machine and 
the use of the social communications media fulfill two important functions (...) The first is psychological 
warfare, targeting the morale of the enemy’s soldiers (...) The second involves gaining support from Western 
Islamic groups, while unifying the Islamic State’s soldiers behind one goal.”[8] In contrast, Lauren Williams 
argues that “Islamic State’s media effort has a number of aims that target both sympathetic and hostile 
audiences. One goal is to recruit supporters (…) A second goal is to generate fear among its opponents, 
which has very specific advantages on the battlefield. A third goal is to assert its legitimacy and gain 
acceptance of its status as a state.”[9] In this context, it must be stressed that the bulk of Islamic State’s releases 
target Muslim societies around the world, although they also attempt to influence “disbelievers”.
From day one, Daesh’s propaganda has utilized advanced methods of distribution. This was one of the 
key reasons for its impressive success. To begin with, Al-Hayat Media Center, as well as other specialized 
cells, benefited from the vast popularity of both mainstream (Facebook, Twitter) and niche social media 
platforms. Unlike many other terrorist organizations, they relied on a massive network of tens of thousands 
of unaffiliated supporters in the Web 2.0 environment, which used the “share” function to transfer the 
propaganda to their followers and peers.[10] This in turn contributed to the creation of a specific “snowball 
effect” in cyberspace. As a result, one message posted in one place could potentially reach hundreds of 
thousands or even millions of Internet users. Clearly Islamic State perfected the use of social media to 
reach audiences, who would normally never seek jihadi materials online. The surprising efficiency of social 
networks in the Islamic State’s strategy was accurately explained by Victoria Pues, who stressed that “young 
westerners encounter (...) terrorist content in their ordinary online environment. It makes a significant 
difference whether we see terror attacks in the format of the evening news or on our newsfeed on Facebook. 
Firstly, it is a more direct conversation between terrorist organization and target on a more individual basis 
(...) Secondly, the content is not framed by the news agency’s comments but is reaching the user unfiltered 
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and framed by harmless tweets and posts of friends. Thirdly, the content published over social media does 
not have the format of ordinary advertisement.”[11] To summarize, thanks to the sophisticated use of social 
networking, as well as thousands of supporters online, the Islamic State’s ideological influences could reach a 
truly global audience.
The same trend occurred in other services corresponding technologically with social media–i.e., image, video 
and audio hosting services such as YouTube, LiveLeak, Instagram or Tumblr. Their popularity was utilized by 
Daesh to spread various types of propaganda, which quickly proliferated in the interconnected environment 
of Web 2.0, despite numerous counteractions by social media service administrators.[12] In fact, services 
which allow audiovisual content online to be posted played a crucial role in Daesh’s cyber jihad. This was 
manifested by the apparent “success” of a video series depicting the savage decapitations of Western citizens, 
such as James Foley, Steven Sotloff, David Haines, Alan Henning or Peter Kassig.[13] These videos spread 
instantly, just after their initial release, across the web, reaching massive audiences.[14] Moreover, they came 
to the increased attention of the mass media, which due to its alarming reports on these executions further 
fueled Internet users’ interest in Islamic State propaganda.
Aside from social media and hosting services, the Islamic State utilized several other channels of distribution. 
Initially, traditional websites and blogs, frequently located on the most popular blogosphere platforms (e.g. 
BlogSpot).[15] They were clearly secondary, backup channels of distribution, as in principle, they are much 
more difficult to find via conventional search engines. Moreover, they are frequently deleted, and thus their 
addresses tend to change. They have, however, two major advantages: they can be easily and quickly recreated 
(using blogger templates) and they can act as repositories, gathering all manner of content released by Daesh 
in one place. Another channel used by the Islamic State in cyberspace is the radio. Despite the fact that since 
its creation the “Caliphate’ did not launch a proper online radio, it operates a conventional one called al-
Bayan, which broadcasts locally in many wilayahs. According to the Memri Cyber & Jihad Lab, its content 
was, however, disseminated in cyberspace using various formats and channels, most notably through the 
archive.org website.[16] Finally, the Islamic State also exploited various online communication applications, 
such as Skype, Signal, Whatsapp and SnapChat. They were usually used for more confidential forms of 
contact. This kind of software was frequently utilized for recruitment purposes at the later stages of selection, 
as it provided a high degree of privacy and security for terrorists.[17]
Daesh propaganda releases can be divided into four major categories:
• audio (radio broadcasts, nasheed music)
• visual (memes, pictures, banners, symbols, infographics)
• audiovisual (execution recordings, battle footage, “documentaries”, interviews, nasheed music videos, 
short advertisements and reportages, such as mujatweets)
• text (websites and social media statements and news, leaders’ declarations, bulletins, online 
magazines)
The most influential and successful pieces of propaganda posted online in 2014 and 2015 were clearly videos, 
which depicted the sheer brutality of the Islamic State’s executioners. These materials proved to be unusual 
and exceptionally disturbing, when compared to the “mainstream” jihadi releases. They proliferated instantly 
over the Web, reaching millions of Internet users, and thus becoming the greatest success in the history 
of cyber jihad.[18] Equally sophisticated audiovisual content in the form of nasheed music videos, which 
frequently resembled the best American and Western European pop stars’ productions, was also hugely 
successful. This was perfectly symbolized by the infamous nasheed entitled Fisabilillah, which encouraged 
recipients to conduct terrorist attacks against the “disbelievers”. Only one of its sources, posted on the popular 
video hosting service LiveLeak, has been viewed more than 120,000 times since April 2015. It has to be 
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stressed that both the audio and visual layers of this music video were very impressive.[19] Other Islamic 
State productions–such as “documentaries”, interviews and reports (e.g. mujatweets, Windows episodes)–were 
clearly designed to look like the best programs from global TV networks. All of them were of the highest 
technical quality and contained sophisticated manipulation techniques. From the plethora of audiovisual 
content, only the ordinary (but still usually recorded in high-definition[20]) battle footage lacked this 
exquisite complexity, yet it was still an important method of glorifying IS members’ heroism and dedication 
to jihad, and thus encouraging recipients to follow in their footsteps.[21]
Texts, including primarily online magazines (“Dabiq”, “Islamic State News”, “Islamic State Report”, “Dar al-
Islam”, “Konstantiniyye”, “Istok” or “Furat Press”)[22], Internet bulletins, as well as declarations and statements 
posted on the web usually had the same high technical quality, as well as exploited similar, advanced 
manipulation methods. Their roles were, however, narrower, as they usually aimed to enlist or strengthen the 
attitudes of jihadist supporters. For instance, “Dabiq” being the most recognized media outlet of this kind, 
frequently used narratives that encouraged Muslims living in the West to conduct hijrah [migration] to the 
Islamic State.[23] Other articles and statements regularly attempted to inform or to mislead global audiences 
about events which held importance for the al-Baghdadi organization. Thus, their importance when it comes 
to shocking and terrorizing “disbelievers” and “crusaders” was rather marginal.
The significance and form of the IS’s visual propaganda varied. Some–such as the ordinary pictures, symbols 
and banners–played rather decorative or informative roles, despite their high quality, as they were extensively 
used in online bulletins, social media, articles, magazines, and movies released on the Internet. However, 
within the wealth of Islamic State visual productions, memes and infographics stood out, as they both 
employed persuasion techniques, were easily exploitable via social media, and appealed to qualitatively 
different groups of receivers. Memes composed of a picture/-s combined with a short text message, on the 
one hand, were designed to reach younger, less educated and less aware audiences. They frequently contained 
references to mass culture canons, such as popular movies, music, ideas, gestures or symbols. These pieces 
of propaganda usually exploited humor and aimed to infect ignorant receivers with jihadist concepts, to 
recruit them or only to improve the organization’s image among the youth. Infographics, on the other hand, 
were designed to reach more demanding and conscious audiences, who usually need illusionary facts and 
statistics, in order to strengthen or to change their attitudes. Both, however, were easily transmittable via 
social media communication channels, and therefore, played a key role in the online strategy of the Islamic 
State.[24]
Audio propaganda fulfilled similar functions. Nasheed songs and radio broadcasts were usually designed 
to encourage Muslim audiences to enter the path of jihad, and to reinforce the attitudes of IS supporters. 
Some also provided false information to audiences. Nasheed songs frequently referred to such themes as war 
and fighting, which inspired some listeners,[25] while, radio broadcasts covered a much wider spectrum of 
issues, ranging from religious programs and nasheeds to news bulletins. The quality of these broadcasts often 
compared favorably to popular Western radio stations like NPR.[26] Nevertheless, this kind of content played 
a rather complementary role in the online strategy of the Islamic State in comparison to its audiovisual, visual 
or text propaganda.
In this context, the Islamic State’s cyber jihad in 2014 and 2015 had several outstanding features, which 
ensured its success:
1. Its initial creativity in the planning and realization of executions was somewhat surprising. In 
addition to beheadings, Daesh members shot, burned and crucified its prisoners, and some victims 
were also dropped from roofs. Sometimes, these executions were carried out by child soldiers, which 
was even more disturbing for audiences, as it was a visible sign of the complete dehumanization of the 
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Islamic State’s propagandists. Obviously, this was done intentionally, in order to shock and intimidate 
“disbelievers”, “apostates”, “crusaders” and “heretics”. 
2. Many of Islamic State’s audiovisual productions (e.g. “documentaries”) were carefully directed and 
edited. As Charlie Winter described one of Daesh’s videos: “undeniably, the production effort behind 
Although the Disbelievers Dislike It was formidable. It is clear that the content of the video was 
carefully considered and the individual (or individuals) who directed it were obvious perfectionists. 
The fact that they took between four and six hours to film a single scene using a number of different 
takes demonstrates this.”[27] These features noticed by Charlie Winter could be observed in the 
majority of serious IS audiovisual productions, which exploited such professional methods of 
filmmaking as: aerial shots, crowd shots, ambient light, various camera angles (even first person), 
compilations, adjusting the range of colors, depth of field, and slow motion.[28] A recent study by 
Ahmet S. Yayla and Anne Speckhard indicates that these advanced techniques, contrary to popular 
belief, were employed not only by foreign-educated IS members, but also locals, such as Syrian 
engineers, using professional equipment.[29]
3. Post-production was also of the highest quality, which was proved by frequent and impressive special 
effects, as well as professional computer graphics (both 2D and 3D). For instance, the al-Hayat Media 
Center 3D official teardrop-like spinning logotype seen at the beginning of many videos can be 
viewed as proof that Daesh make use of a team of skillful and experienced CG artists.
4. The majority of productions, especially those aimed at non-Arabic speaking audiences, were released 
in high-definition, which was rare among other terrorist groups in 2014.
5. Its audiovisuals were usually well-thought-out and far more sophisticated than the average cyber 
jihadist messages. Aside from “traditional” content like forced prisoners’ speeches, Daesh productions 
frequently referred to the most up-to-date political events, commented on statements of NATO/
EU state leaders, contained professionally conducted interviews, street surveys, and presented the 
ordinary life of Islamic State citizens. Moreover, all of Daesh’s propaganda materials, including 
“documentaries”, reports, interviews, articles, nasheeds and the aforementioned executions, utilized 
advanced propaganda techniques. The most evident were: artificial dichotomy (demonizing the kuffar 
and “crusaders”), bandwagoning (presenting Daesh as the bright and only valid future for Muslims), 
testimonial, deification (appealing to the Quran and Allah), glittering generalities and the distortion 
of data (providing manipulated or forged statistics). 
6. The propaganda strategy of the Islamic State was strongly supported by a number of professionals 
originating from NATO/EU states, which allowed the quality of its productions to be taken to a 
whole new level. Some of the best-known examples include the former German rapper Denis Cuspert 
(Deso Dogg, who was responsible for nasheed production), IT specialist Mohammed Emwazi (Jihadi 
John, who participated in the most ill-famed executions), and the British rapper Abdel-Majed Abdel 
Bary (L.Jinny, who conducted propaganda on Twitter). This could explain the unusual fitting of IS 
propaganda to mass culture and cyber culture canons in the Web 2.0 environment. 
7. In principle, the campaign was also multilingual. Daesh published its releases not only in English and 
Arabic, but also in German, French, Russian, Polish, Mandarin Chinese, Bengali, Uyghur, Sorani, 
Indonesian and Turkish.[30] This effectively meant that it was the first cyber jihadi campaign to ever 
have truly global scope, reaching not only Muslim societies but also these nations and ethnic groups, 
which should not be an important target for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s organization. Such a solution 
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resulted in significant success, as even in relatively homogenous, Christian countries, this propaganda 
allowed some new members to be recruited. For instance, there were dozens of Polish citizens fighting 
for the Islamic State in mid-2016.[31] 
Finally, it must be stressed that the early propaganda strategy of the Islamic State in cyberspace had a 
feature that is rarely discussed but which greatly contributed to its initial success: it employed methods of 
distribution similar to viral marketing. It seems that the propaganda cells of the Islamic State from day one 
attempted to generate a “viral effect”, which refers to attracting receivers’ interest in order to “infect” them 
with an idea, subsequently transferred by them to other users through social networks.[32] Viral marketing 
is an increasingly popular method of advertising products or brands offline and online, but it had not been 
utilized intentionally by terrorist organizations before 2014. And in this case, both the content, and the 
distribution methods of the IS clearly imitated this kind of innovative communication strategy. On the one 
hand, the vast majority of its productions were designed to strike audiences with unconventionality, which 
is a sine qua non requirement for something to “go viral”. As mentioned above, they were of the highest, 
exquisite technical quality, distinguishing themselves from the plethora of other cyber jihadi releases.
[33] They also depicted unimaginable cruelty and referred to the latest popular culture trends, canons 
and fashions, such as games, Hollywood movies or humorous memes (frequently presenting cats).[34] 
This approach was clearly designed to enable Western audiences to fully embrace manipulated messages.
[35] Yet, on the other hand, these pieces of jihadi content were primarily distributed with the use of the 
aforementioned, diverse social media communication channels, which enabled and increased the chances of 
the “viral effect” to occur.
Cracks in the Online Caliphate?
At first glance the Islamic State’s propaganda in 2016 did not change significantly in comparison to 2014 
and 2015. The bulk of its audiovisual content seems to have the same features as the first, infamous videos 
which caused such major upset among Western audiences two years ago. Their quality, when it comes to 
directing, editing, post-production, special effects, and the manipulation techniques employed, usually not 
only remains at the same first-class level but also indicates certain improvements in a number of areas. For 
instance, Daesh has started to more commonly exploit drone videos[36], especially to make up SVBIED 
attacks and battle footage. Their intros based on computer-generated imagery (CGI) are also much more 
impressive than a year or two ago (e.g. al-Battar Media Foundation 3D logo). Moreover, its text propaganda 
has been enriched with a new type of online magazine—“Rumiyah”—which has a modern-looking layout 
and a slightly different focus and size than “Dabiq”. While still attacking enemies of the “Caliphate” and 
inspiring readers to conduct terrorist attacks against the kuffar, it frequently supports the use of knifes and 
cars instead of less accessible guns and explosives.[37] Such appeals have been carried out before by the IS 
before, but never with such intensity[38] and to such a high level of sophistication. This move seemed to have 
had a significant impact on the latest Ohio State University attack, conducted by Abdul Razak Ali Artan, 
who rammed a car into pedestrians and stabbed them with a knife shortly after these releases.[39] Another 
innovative feature introduced by Daesh concerns a series of “photo reportages” depicting assassinations of its 
enemies in Yemen, shown in the first person perspective (FPP), which brings to mind the popular FPP video 
games genre.[40] Its activities are also increasingly focused on children, which was proved by the release of 
the mobile app Huroof, containing jihadi images and terminology.[41] Daniel Milton accurately notes that 
“Islamic State propaganda videos and executions routinely target children as the main audience. While a 
number of analysts have discussed the group’s use of child soldiers, the fact that children appear to be a target 
population of the group’s media efforts raises additional long-term concerns about deradicalization and the 
possibility of future threats.”[42]
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A more detailed analysis of the Islamic State’s cyber jihad in 2016 shows, however, that it is not as perfect as 
its members and sympathizers would like it to be. While still being the best Islamist online propaganda out 
there, a number of features can be noticed that indicate arising weaknesses and problems. To begin with, the 
Islamic State’s productions while improving in certain areas, manifest some technical clumsiness in others. 
Some of the newest high-profile videos contain evident editing, montage and post-production mistakes, 
which were previously very rare. For instance, the video entitled Glory Road (length: 11:42), which was 
produced by the al-Battar Media Foundation in August 2016 and presented the Islamic State’s viewpoint on 
the war in Libya, contains an embarrassing spelling mistake at 08:39: “Battles between the Islamic Statw and 
soldiers of Taghut in Sirte.”[43] Such basic errors in the IS’s promotional videos of 2014 and 2015 were rather 
unthinkable. This effectively means that al-Battar’s members did not examine this film carefully before its 
final rendering and release, which may highlight personnel shortages, excessive hastiness or incompetence. 
Even the most publicized and carefully considered pieces of IS propaganda, characterized by outstanding 
technical quality, are not flawless. Some of the most significant, such as the one presenting John Cantlie’s 
remarks on Daesh’s anti-tank warfare from December 2016, contained some visible inconsistencies. Despite 
its remarkable introduction, the rest of the “documentary” is uneven at best. The interludes in the movie are 
of a much lower quality than the introduction and it lacks a proper ending. Moreover, it exploits well-known 
and already played out scenes depicting destroyed Abrams tanks, which were recorded in 2014 in Iraq.[44] 
Thus, it does not look to be a significant step forward in comparison to, for example, the infamous Flames of 
War (length: 55:14)[45] from 2014 or the short No Respite (04:13).[46]
The Islamic State is also becoming increasingly dependent on photo reports and short battle videos, bearing 
no signs of advanced post-production attempts, which in principle are much more apt for mass production 
and distribution. This has become especially evident since the beginning of the Mosul operation in Iraq in 
October 2016. Frequently these materials are re-used several times in various forms, such as compilations.
[47] On the one hand, this trend increases the sheer scale of its cyber jihadist campaign. On the other, 
however, it may be a sign that the specialized propaganda bureaus have encountered problems with 
generating enough output of more sophisticated productions, and they are compensating for this by using a 
surplus of simpler and shorter releases. Such a trend, in consequence, lowers the efficiency of Daesh’s online 
campaign. Reaching and terrorizing societies of developed states is much more difficult with this type of 
propaganda, as it is generally much less attractive for ordinary Internet users.
Audio propaganda has encountered some visible setbacks as well. Since its proclamation, the “Caliphate” has 
released dozens of nasheeds in cyberspace.[48] However, none of those published in 2016 were as popular 
and technically advanced as the infamous Fisabilillah music video from 2015 or the Let’s Go for Jihad from 
2014.[49] It is difficult to find a recording of this kind which attracted increased attention in 2016. Moreover, 
some analysts have noticed that recently the IS’s frequency in publishing Arabic nasheeds has decreased, 
in comparison to the al-Hayat Media Center output, which is responsible for releases in other languages. 
According to Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “it is possible the small output partly reflects a disruption to the 
Islamic State’s media production in terms of killing potential Arabic language munshids, while al-Hayat media 
has continued to produce nasheeds in languages besides Arabic.”[50]
The significant decrease in the output of the Islamic State’s propaganda campaign was proven by the recent 
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point study, which collected more than 9,000 Daesh videos and about 
52,000 photographs, released online between January 2015 and August 2016. According to its author, Daniel 
Milton, the Islamic State’s monthly production of visual content dropped from 761 in August 2015 to 194 
in August 2016.[51] This huge and steady decrease manifests serious malfunctions within the Islamic State’s 
cyber jihadi machinery.
In this context, the biggest challenge that the Islamic State faces nowadays in cyberspace concerns the 
decreasing availability of online propaganda distribution channels, previously based mostly on social 
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media. Since 2014 top social media companies have reiterated attempts to curb Daesh’s PSYOPs, which had 
previously brought rather limited effects. However, since the second half of 2015 the efficiency of the combat 
against jihadi content online seems to have increased. Twitter alone banned about 125,000 jihadi accounts 
(mostly related to the IS) since mid-2015 to February 2016.[52] Additionally, between January 2016 and 
August 2016, 235 000 accounts were deleted.[53] J.M. Berger and Heather Perez’s study indicates that there 
were usually no more than 1,000 English-speaking pro-ISIS accounts on Twitter at any given time between 
June and October 2015. Moreover, they noted that the follower count of these accounts dropped due to an 
“aggressive wave of suspensions.”[54] However, as Daniel Milton notes, “Islamic State social media accounts 
that have been taken down do not give up, but instead continue to reemerge on social media platforms under 
different usernames.”[55]. Nevertheless, such a continuous reemergence usually does not allow them to fully 
reconstruct their former network of followers.[56] In effect, the general amount of Islamic State’s propaganda 
accessible via Twitter, as well as via other communication platforms has been reduced.
It is not only social media administrators that have been fighting against jihadis in cyberspace.[57] The same 
trend is increasingly visible among many online media outlets and ordinary Internet users, who frequently 
ridicule Islamic State’s members with humorous productions. One of the most famous cases concerns the 
video entitled What It’s Really Like to Fight for the Islamic State published on YouTube by Vice News in April 
2016. This piece was recorded by the headcam of a fallen member of the IS and depicted an extraordinarily 
clumsy fighter called Abu Hajaar during a firefight. The film instantly went viral (above 7 million views by 
the end of 2016)[58], as it depicted chaos, incompetence and frustration among the Islamic State’s ranks, 
disenchanting the professional image of jihadists, created by Daesh propaganda.[59] Moreover, there are 
dozens of popular and comical memes concerning this subject, presenting for instance, Islamic State’s “air 
force” in the form of flying camels.[60] Finally, its releases are also combated by hacktivists. ‘Anonymous’ 
conducted a massive hacking operation against Daesh’s supporters on Twitter in June 2016.[61]
To recapitulate, it must be stressed that the Web 2.0 environment has become a much more hostile place for 
jihadis. There is notably less Islamic State propaganda in popular social networks nowadays. Its releases are 
also deleted much quicker than before. Obviously, accounts in social networks are easy to recreate, but it 
takes time to gather followers again. Therefore, the very coverage of Daesh’s online campaign has seemed to 
plunge. Islamic State still attempts to use these outlets (e.g. Twitter), usually with little success in the long run, 
but at the same time, it has started to focus more on other communication channels. One can mention niche 
social media, message boards (Ansar AlKhelafa Europe), hosting services, blogosphere platforms, as well as 
encrypted applications, such as Telegram. Even there, however, al-Baghdadi’s organization has decreasing 
room for maneuver. For instance, Telegram–which had become a leading and convenient communication 
tool for Daesh–has started to ban pro-IS channels recently.[62] Obviously, this does not mean that it is 
impossible to access this type of content anymore. Many pieces of the “Caliphate’s” propaganda are still easily 
accessible via gore or no-censorship websites. Some are also available via the Internet Archive or multiple 
sharing platforms. Nevertheless, Islamic State is nowhere near reaching its former efficiency of propaganda 
distribution from 2014 and 2015. These services and platforms, such as justpaste.it or blogs usually offer 
limited reach, evanescence and lack of interconnectedness which impedes Daesh’s communication strategy, 
previously based on the exploitation of the Web 2.0 environment and a kind of “marketing buzz”. Effectively, 
none of the 2016 releases were comparable, in terms of their proliferation scale, to the infamous executions 
of James Foley or Steven Sotloff. Moreover, none of them—excluding the embarrassing recording released by 
Vice News -have gone viral.[63]
Reasons Behind the Shift in the Islamic State’s Cyber Jihad
The aforementioned shortcomings of the IS’s propaganda campaign in 2016 have several causes. To begin 
with, Islamic State’s releases are gradually losing their uniqueness, which was so striking in 2014 and 2015. 
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Judging by the content of online magazines, nasheeds and audiovisual productions, their creators are suffering 
a serious creativity crisis. When the first major IS productions started to emerge online in 2014, they were 
fresh and unique in comparison to the earlier releases of other Islamist terrorist organizations. After two 
years, most potential audiences (including journalists) got somewhat weary with the similar issues addressed 
by the IS’s cells over and over again. Their methods of presentation, excluding those mentioned above, were 
also not innovative. This trend is perfectly visible in the online magazines, which are usually repeating the 
same topics regularly. These include: martyred terrorists, calls to hijrah, attacks against the “disbelievers” and 
“crusaders”, boasting over the legitimacy of the Caliphate and successful operations, recruitment appeals, 
inspiration to conduct terrorist attacks against the kuffar, and various theological deliberations. Also the 
audiovisual content did not change significantly. The IS still publishes execution videos, as well as recordings 
depicting fallen enemies—such as Iraqi, Turkish or Syrian soldiers–but its bestiality has ceased to shock the 
majority of accustomed spectators. It basically means that there is far less chance that these productions will 
draw enough attention to spark a proper viral effect, unlike the 2014 executions.
Secondly, this state of affairs is also caused by the aforementioned policy introduced by leading social 
network companies, who–due to widespread criticism–have boosted their efforts in combating terrorism. 
Twitter, being the most frequently utilized by Daesh supporters, has not only deleted numerous reported 
jihadi accounts, but also increased “the size of the teams that review reports, reducing (…) response time 
significantly.” It has also introduced new tools to fight spam, initiated cooperation with law enforcement 
institutions and entered into partnership with organizations countering extremist content online (e.g. PAVE, 
Institute for Strategic Dialogue).[64] Moreover, in December 2016 Twitter, Facebook, Microsoft and YouTube 
teamed up to develop innovative tools of identifying terrorist imagery and videos. As their statement 
declares: “we commit to the creation of a shared industry database of “hashes”–unique digital “fingerprints”–
for violent imagery or terrorist recruitment videos or images that we have removed from our services. By 
sharing this information with each other, we may use the shared hashes to help identify potential terrorist 
content on our respective hosted consumer platforms.”[65] The rising importance of this agenda in the 
activities of the leading social media groups was already reflected in the aforementioned Islamic State’s 
distribution strategies.
Similarly, the same policy was introduced by many governments, which have developed two types of 
solutions. On the one hand, some institutions–such as the U.S. Department of State–have initiated a counter-
propaganda campaign aiming to expose the brutality of the Islamic State. In principle, it was expected to 
curb IS recruitment efforts. Initiated in 2014, it was composed of multilingual videos and social media 
messages. An analogous solution was introduced a year later by the British Foreign Office, who created a 
Twitter account: “UK against ISIL”. Security services have started to monitor and disrupt communication 
channels used by Islamists, and have also increased their efforts to detect and arrest all those responsible for 
distributing Daesh propaganda. For instance, in 2016 New Zealand’s court sentenced Imran Patel for making, 
distributing and possessing Islamic State propaganda.[66]
Cracks in the online “Caliphate” are also caused by serious offline problems suffered by the organization. 
Since 2015, the strategic situation of the Islamic State in the Middle East has aggravated significantly. Russian 
and Turkish interventions in Syria allowed some territories formerly under al-Baghdadi’s control to be 
regained. In the second half of 2016 the Iraqi army–as well as its allied forces (the Peshmerga, militias)–also 
launched a massive operation aimed at recapturing Daesh’s stronghold in Iraq, Mosul.[67] Additionally, 
it suffered significant defeats from the Syrian Democratic Forces in November and December 2016.[68] 
Moreover, constant aerial bombardments, conducted both by the U.S.-led coalition and Russia, are aimed 
not only against Daesh positions on the frontlines but also against its infrastructure, which causes logistical 
disruption and significant financial losses. According to the Wilson Center data from March 2016, the 
U.S. and its allies conducted more than 10,000 airstrikes against the Islamic State alone, which damaged or 
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destroyed more than 21,500 targets.[69] As reported by Israeli officials in October 2016, Daesh had lost about 
10,000 fighters in the previous 18 months.[70] 
On the one hand, it has to be stressed that due to these military defeats and aerial bombardments, Daesh has 
suffered a budget shortfall, which has forced its leaders to cut salaries of IS members by around 50%. Many of 
the fighters which were responsible for managing energy resources ––a major source of revenue–have been 
killed.[71] According to the recent ICSR report, in just two years the group’s income decreased by about 50%, 
to a level of $520-$870 million in 2016.[72] Considering the fact that the bulk of their funds must be destined 
for military expenditures, the propaganda arm is undoubtedly underfinanced.
On the other hand, available information on the U.S.-led airstrikes suggests that they are particularly focused 
on disrupting the organization’s propaganda potential. Since 2016, they have successfully targeted and 
eliminated a number of key figures in the Islamic State’s media arm, such as Abu Mohammed al-Adnani 
(IS’s spokesman and chief propagandist), Wa’il Adil Hasan Salman al-Fayad (IS’s minister of information, 
overseeing, among others, execution videos released online), Mahmoud al-Isawi (Daesh’s propaganda 
supervisor in Raqqa), and Ibrahim al-Ansari (responsible for the recruitment of foreign fighters and online 
instructions for homegrown terrorists).[73] According to Missy Ryan and Greg Miller, “Adnani’s death would 
damage the Islamic State in two areas that have made the terrorist organization particularly dangerous: its 
sophisticated use of social media to reach a global audience and its willingness to employ the crudest forms 
of violence.”[74]
Islamic State has also suffered significant losses among lower-ranked propagandists of great importance. 
For instance, the infamous Jihadi John was killed by a drone strike in January 2016. As mentioned before, he 
was one of the key figures responsible for the unusual success of the first execution videos released on the 
Internet. It is worth mentioning that he also possessed advanced knowledge and understanding of digital 
technologies, as he was a graduate of Information Systems with Business Management from the University 
of Westminster. This meant that he could contribute to the high technical quality of the Daesh productions.
[75] Former British rapper L.Jinny vel Abdel-Majed Abdel Bary abandoned the Islamic State’s ranks in 2015. 
Until that moment, he was an important person in the IS’s operations in Anglophone social media (Twitter). 
Furthermore, due to his music career in the West, he possessed invaluable knowledge and experience for the 
organization.[76] There were also false reports on the death of the infamous former German rapper Deso 
Dogg (Denis Cuspert), who has been engaged in the propaganda arm of the “Caliphate” since joining the 
group.[77] It may be, however, that his ability to act freely in Syria and Iraq has been limited, as he is one of 
the top figures being hunted by the coalition. All the aforementioned cases suggest that similar losses could 
be suffered among the ordinary members taking part in the production or distribution of cyber jihadist 
content.[78] This would explain the aforementioned uneven quality and errors in many recent Daesh 
productions, as well as their decreased output.
Summary
The Islamic State’s extraordinary propaganda campaign, initiated at the turn of 2014, has finally experienced 
some setbacks after two years of constant progress. In 2016, the problems in the “Caliphate’s” cyber jihad 
manifested themselves in the quantity and quality of the releases, as well as their reach. None of the IS’s 
declining number of propaganda products sparked increased interest from worldwide audiences, as they 
are much more difficult to access, sometimes contain embarrassing mistakes, and they have lost the trait of 
uniqueness, which is crucial to generating the viral effect. Thus, the general popularity of the Islamic State’s 
jihadi messages nowadays is much lower than two years ago. Daesh is indeed losing ground in the battle for 
cyberspace, as throughout just one calendar year it was forced to refocus from its already tried, tested and 
efficient communication channels to new and less popular ones, where the organization also encounters 
unexpected obstacles.
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This essentially means that the combination of proactive antiterrorist measures employed by IT companies 
and security services in the Web 2.0 environment, the counter-propaganda campaign conducted 
independently by many Internet users, as well as massive airstrikes targeting IS’s logistical backbone and key 
Daesh propagandists has finally led to some tangible effects. The Islamic State, nowadays, fails to maintain its 
former, top-notch level of cyber jihad, as it struggles with serious financial and personnel shortcomings, as 
well as with the increasingly hostile digital environment.
These first “cracks” in the online “Caliphate”, as examined in this article, may be a great and unique chance 
for Western nations. The current situation is a fantastic starting point to develop a worldwide counter-
propaganda strategy, which will take advantage of the troubles experienced by the Islamic State. Obviously, 
it will never be possible to completely block all extremist content in cyberspace without violating the 
fundamental rights of Internet users, such as the freedom of communication and the right to privacy. 
However, it is possible to curb the global resonance of Daesh’s online broadcasts, especially considering the 
fact that it may lose most of its territories in the Middle East in the near future. Cutting off the logistics and 
financing behind this propaganda machine using troops and air forces active in the region, combined with 
the already initiated efforts in the online environment is the right way to go. This, in turn, would mitigate 
many contemporary threats emanating from the phenomenon of cyber jihad.
All the aforementioned considerations, to be clear, do not mean that the Islamic State’s cyber jihad has 
already ceased to be a major threat to international security. Its presence in the most popular social networks, 
while diminishing over time, is still noticeable. Moreover, despite all the previously mentioned flaws, it 
is still the best example of Islamist propaganda on the Internet. Other terrorist organizations attempt to 
mimic its online solutions to a certain extent, but even the best among them, such as al-Qaeda, are nowhere 
near the competence of the al-Hayat Media Center or even the unofficial bureaus, such as the al-Battar 
Media Foundation. Some of their messages still surprise audiences, including academics, with their level of 
sophistication and proficiency in using manipulation techniques. To summarize, it is too early to state that 
the organization was pushed back to the “digital underground”, but it is surely on the road to getting there in 
the future.
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